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POLLUTION OF THE GREAT LAKES: A JOINT
APPROACH BY CANADA AND THE
UNITED STATES
This Comment concerns the causes and cure of the pollu-
tion of the Great Lakes. In order to fully comprehend and appre-
ciate the nature of the problem, a brief review of the past and pres-
ent status of the situation will be examined. There are several
possible solutions which are considered and discussed, together
with an evaluation of the wisdom and feasibility of each. The
ultimate goal of pollution control is to return the Great Lakes to
the natural conditions of earlier unadulterated days, before they
are but a memory in the minds of only a few.
I. BACKGROUND AND EXTENT OF THE
POLLUTION IN THE GREAT LAKES
The Great Lakes constitute nearly one-fourth of the earth's
total supply of fresh surface water, measuring 5500 cubic miles
and 95,000 square miles of surface area; larger than the surface
area of the states of Pennsylvania and New York combined.
Two-thirds of this area is within the jurisdiction of the United
States and one-third is within the jurisdiction of Canada. Fur-
thermore, sixty percent of the Canadian population and economy
is located around the rim of the Great Lakes and the St. Lawrence
Basins, as well as fifteen percent of the population and econ-
omy of the United States. The area presently supports over 40
million people, and a population of 60 million is projected for the
year 2000.1
The aesthetic, recreational and economic character of the
Lakes has served those in the area for as long as the region has
been inhabited. Yet, the peoples of both nations have caused such
deterioration in these natural resources that they are in a very
real danger of dying.
The governments of Canada and the United States have been
aware of this deterioration since 1912, when they requested the
1. THE CANADIAN DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, MINES AND RESOURCES, KEYS
TO A CONTINENT: THE GREAT LAKES (1970). See P. PIPER, THE INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW OF THE GREAT LAKES (1967).
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International Joint Commission (IJC) to study the sources of
pollution in all boundary waters between the two countries.' The
Commission made an extensive five year study and submitted its
report in 1918.1 The IJC research showed that there was sub-
stantial pollution in the Great Lakes and recommended that ap-
propriate steps be taken to curtail the situation before an emer-
gency resulted. However, with World War I raging, little was
done and as a result the problem dragged on.
In 1946, the two countries again referred the issue of bound-
ary water pollution to the IJC. The findings of the Commis-
sion, released in 1951, revealed that pollution from both sides of
the border was continuing with the result that interests on each
side were being adversely affected, because the currents and flow
patterns spread the pollutants uniformly throughout the Lakes.4
The IJC concluded that,
the pollution of the boundary waters under reference is taking
place to an extent which is injurious to health and property
principally by reason of domestic sewage and industrial wastes
discharged along the shores of the boundary waters, on tribu-
taries of the boundary waters, and, to a lesser extent, by
sewage and other wastes discharged from vessels engaged in
passenger and freight traffic on these waters. 5
One of the most comprehensive studies ever undertaken in
the area of water pollution was completed by the IJC in 1969.6
2. The International Joint Commission (IJC) was created by the 1909
Boundary Waters Treaty between the United States and Canada. 36 STAT. 2448.
It is a permanent body composed of three commissioners from each country.
It performs investigatory and research functions when problems concerning the
international boundary between the two countries are referred to it by either or
both of the countries. It has the power and obligation to report its findings to
the two countries as to matters which are referred to it, but it cannot act of its
own volition. Furthermore, it has no judicial or enforcement powers.
3. IJC, REPORT (1918).
4. IJC, REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMMISSION ON POLLUTION
OF THE BOUNDARY WATERS (1951).
5. id. at 20.
6. THE INTERNATIONAL LAKE ERIE WATER POLLUTION BOARD AND THE
INTERNATIONAL LAKE ONTARIO-ST. LAWRENCE RIVER WATER POLLUTION BOARD,
REPORT TO THE INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMMISSION ON THE POLLUTION OF LAKE
ERIE, LAKE ONTARIO AND THE INTERNATIONAL SECTION OF THE ST. LAWRENCE
RIVER, vol. I (1969). These two boards were created by the UC for the pur-
poses of this and future investigation and research in the area of water pollution
in these bodies of water between the United States and Canada. The boards
are composed of representatives from the governments of New York, Pennsyl-
vania, Ohio, Michigan and the province of Ontario.
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The Commission reported that over the years pollutants had been
injected into the Lakes in such large quantities that the quality of
the water has deteriorated. The IJC concluded that the source
of the pollution was from both the United States and Canada
and that the pollution had reached such an extent "that it is
causing and is likely to cause injury to health and property on the
other side of the boundary."' 7 Furthermore, the Commission con-
firmed the findings of the 1951 IJC study re the flow patterns of
the Lakes.
The 1969 IJC Report addressed itself primarily to the pol-
lution of Lake Erie and Lake Ontario. Notwithstanding the fact
that these two lakes are the smallest of the five Great Lakes, they
have been the major recipients of pollution, since over one-
half of the population of the Great Lakes region work and live
around these two lakes. The report indicates that the pollution
level in these two basins has already reached alarming propor-
tions. In addition, the projected population and industrial growth
study indicates that by 1986 there will be a doubling of the adul-
terated materials that are now produced by municipalities and in-
dustries in the area.8
On the basis of these extensive studies, the IJC has recom-
mended that both the United States and Canada take effective ac-
tion immediately in order to reverse the deteriorating conditions
of the Lakes. The IJC stated that
[p]ollution impairs the quality and usefulness of water. It
makes it unfit for domestic or industrial use, and recreation,
and may cause serious illness. It destroys fish and wildlife.
It creates offensive conditions and interferes with navigation.
It may create areas of desolation and render the stream useless
for constructive purposes. It causes economic losses and it
reduces the capacity of waters to perform their many beneficial
and necessary functions.9
To that end, the two governments have begun to legislate and en-
force pollution control on either side of the boundary waters.
II. THE U.S. POSITION ON WATER POLLUTION CONTROL
In 1948, the United States Congress passed the first com-
prehensive measure aimed specifically at the control of water pol-
7. Id. at 7.
8. See note 6 supra, vol. II (Lake Erie) and vol. III (Lake Ontario).
9. IJC, SAFEGUARDING BOUNDARY WATER QUALrrY 14 (1961).
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lution in the United States.' ° Since that time there has been a pa-
rade of theories which has governed the legislation and the posi-
tion of the federal government in the United States regarding
water pollution control."
Federal regulation and codification in the area of water pollu-
tion control is an effort to strike a balance between the sovereignty
of the states and power of the federal government. The earlier
statutes sought a balance in favor of the states. Early U.S. Su-
preme Court decisions were substantially in accord with that the-
ory.12  Although Congress has authority either under the com-
merce, navigation, or promotion of the general welfare power to
10. 62 STAT. 1155. This Act created and established the Federal Water
Pollution Control Administration. The Act also provided for federal support of
research, funding, and general federal assistance to the states for water pollu-
tion control.
11. a. 66 STAT. 755. This 1952 Act extended the provisions of the 1948
Act through 1956.
b. In 1956 an Act was created to be more comprehensive and to in-
crease federal-state cooperation in developing programs like building
sewage treatment plants. 70 STAT. 498.
c. The 1961 Act increased federal participation both money-wise and
structure-wise as the administration of the program was vested in
the office of the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare.
75 STAT. 204.
d. The Water Quality Act of 1965 and the Clean Waters Restoration
Act of 1966 were the forerunners to the current U.S. legislation
and position.
1. The 1965 Act (79 STAT. 897) set up a program which called for
the states to adopt water quality standards in cooperation with
the Secretary of the Interior (the F.W.P.C.A. was transferred
to the Secretary of the Interior from the Secretary of Health,
Education and Welfare under Reorganization Plan No. 2 in
1966). This Act called for more federal research in coopera-
tion with the states as well as more federal funding propor-
tionate to that of the states.
2. The 1966 Act (89 STAT. 753) called for large federal spending
in order to construct sewage treatment plans, but only 50% of
the money was ever appropriated.
e. The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (83 STAT. 852Y
created the Council on Environmental Quality.
f. The Water Quality Act of 1970 (84 STAT. 91) deals mainly with
oil pollution in waterways and the pollution caused by vessels,
It does create, though, the Office of Environmental Quality to fur-
nish staff support for the Council on Environmental Quality
(which will monitor national federal pollution control).
12. See Arizona v. California, 375 U.S. 546 (1963); Nebraska v. Wyoming,
325 U.S. 589 (1945); Colorado v. Kansas, 320 U.S. 383 (1945); Wyoming v.
Colorado, 259 U.S. 419 (1922). See also 11 STAN. L. REV. 665, for a complete
bibliography of American interstate water cases.
Vol. 2
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take over the fight against water pollution in the United States en
toto, the authority has never been exercised. As a result of the
continuing effort to balance the responsibilities for the control of
water pollution between the states and the federal government,
there has been a steady deterioration of the nation's lakes and
waterways. Therefore, Congress has been forced to take respon-
sibility that it had never before assumed.' 3 The intrusion by the
federal government was prompted by the belief in Washington
that the limited financial resources of the individual states could
not effectively cope with the problem. 4
Current federal policy has not completely preempted the lo-
cal pollution control efforts. Federal involvement has been re-
stricted to financial and technical aid whenever possible. Wash-
ington has intervened only when such action has appeared to
have been the most efficient way to control pollution, either be-
cause the local governments were ignoring the problem or were
inept.',
The major factor limiting local control of water pollution is
the necessitated billions of dollars that an effective control program
must consume in order to be operative.' President Johnson
faced this reality in the mid-1960's when he aimed the federal
spending program along its current course of supplementing local
efforts. The 1969 and 1970 Acts have followed suit.1" The cur-
rent federal position has been summarized as follows:
Financial constraints on local governments, perhaps reinforced
by expectations of Federal assistance, have created a general
dependence on Federal revenues; and any expansion of local
government services may be expected to require Federal as-
13. 112 CONG. REC. 321 (daily ed. Feb. 23, 1966). Message delivered by
President Lyndon B. Johnson.
14. See Birmingham, The Federal Government and Air and Water Pollu-
tion, 23 Bus. LAw. 467 (1968); Hines, Nor Any Drop To Drink: Public Regu-
lations of Water Quality Part III: The Federal Effort, 52 IowA L. REV. 799
(1967).
15. Hines, supra note 14.
16. THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, REPORT OF THE DEPARTMENT
OF THE INTERIOR, FEDERAL WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ADMINISTRATION TO THE
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES: THE COST OF CLEAN WATER, vol. I (Jan. 10,
1968); THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, THE ECONOMICS OF CLEAN
WATER (March 1970).
17. Message by President Lyndon B. Johnson to the Congress of the
United States on March 8, 1968, To Renew A Nation, Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents, vol. IV, No. 10, 407-483 (March 11, 1968); see note
11 supra.
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sistance-particularly under conditions of money market re-
straints. 18
As to the federal position on water pollution control it should
be remembered that the riparian states hold the title to water and
lake beds 9 subject to the paramount authority of the federal gov-
ernment on matters of navigation and commerce. 20 But even
though the federal government has intervened in the pollution con-
trol problem, it has done so only to help the local governments
operate, and not with the intention of usurping the power of the
local governments, or challenging their sovereignty. Because of
aid from the federal government, many municipalities have be-
come active and effective in the pollution control field.2 '
The federal government has sought to provide the necessary
means for the fight against pollution in the Great Lakes. For ex-
ample, the United States has developed a working and effective
contingency plan for the clean up of oil spills in the Lakes.2 2 The
18. THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, THE ECONOMICS OF CLEAN
WATER, 6-7 (March 1970), which reported that:
a. Just to handle public waste treatment, tiansmission and disposal
within the next five years (up to 1975) for facilities to comply with
water quality standards will cost ten billion dollars.
b. It will cost 1.2 billion dollars a year for collection sewers.
c. Separation of storm centers will cost from 15 billion to 49 billion
dollars.
d. Industrial waste treatment control will cost from 2.2 to 4.4 billion
dollars.
e. Industrial cooling facilities will cost 1.9 billion dollars.
f. Sediment control and acid mine drainage reduction will cost from
1.7 to 6.6 billion dollars.
19. See THE SUBMERGED LAND ACT OF 1953, 67 STAT. 29; 65 C.J.S.
NAVIGABLE WATERS § 92; and 56 AM. JUR. WATERS § 52.
20. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8; 56 AM. JUR. WATERS §§ 190-200; The
Daniel Ball, 10 Wall. 563 (1870).
21. In 1955 the riparian states of the Great Lakes formed the Great Lakes
Compact which recommends measures to the states pertaining to the utilization
and development of the Lakes. There was a provision for the membership of
Ontario and Quebec, but Congress never gave its approval to their membership.
See U.S. Congress, Senate, Subcommittee on Foreign Relations, Hearings, The
Great Lakes Basin, 84th Cong. 2d Sess., 6-8, 14, 17, 31-32 (1956); and the U.S.
Congress, Senate, Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary, Hearings,
Great Lakes Basin Compact, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 5 (1958). Furthermore, the
riparians of each lake have formed water pollution enforcement agencies which
meet and exchange ideas and plans concerning water pollution problems in the
Great Lakes.
22. IJC, TmRD INTERIM REPORT ON POLLUTION OF LAKE ERIE, LAKE ON-
TARIO AND THE INTERNATIONAL SECTION OF THE ST. LAWRENCE RIVER: SPECIAL
REPORT ON POTENTIAL OIL POLLUTION EUTROPHICATION AND POLLUTION FROM
WATERCRAFT, at 25 (1970).
Vol. 2
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1970 Water Quality Improvement Act provides for aid to the states
or any political subdivision for the development of effective con-
trol of pollution in the Great Lakes.23 Furthermore, the 1970
pollution control report by the Department of the Interior recog-
nizes the problem in the Great Lakes and has provided for tech-
nical assistance to the IJC through the Federal Water Quality Ad-
ministration.2
III. THE CANADIAN POSITION ON WATER
POLLUTION CONTROL
Until 1970, the federal government of Canada had very little
in the way of either effective water pollution control legislation or
enforcement agencies.15  There was some legislation both at the
provincial and federal levels, but for the most part it was an inef-
fective and uncoordinated effort.
In 1970, Canada passed the Canada Water Act.2 6 It is the
first operational attack on water pollution in Canada at the national
level. The legislation provides the mechanism for multipurpose
water resource planning and comprehensive water management.
The Act is a vehicle not only for purposes of study and planning,
but for the implementation of water quality standards as well.
If put to its fullest and most beneficial use, the Act will be inte-
grated with the already existing provincial legislation and agencies
and will serve to be an effective water control and planning de-
vice. Although Henry Landis, General Counsel of the Ontario
Water Resources Commission, points out that the control of water
and water pollution in Canada is a matter of provincial concern,
the Canada Water Act may be used to supplement the operations
and efforts of the provinces.
The value of the Canada Water Act is that it demonstrates
the facing of a financial reality by the Canadian federal govern-
ment. Although Mr. Landis is undoubtedly correct in his asser-
tion of the provincial sovereignty in the area of water control in
Canada, the budgets of the provinces, as those of the states in the
23. 84 STAT. 91, at 104, § 15.
24. FEDERAL WATER QUALITY ADMINISTRATION, CLEAN WATER FOR THE
1970's: A STATUS REPORT, at 72 (1970).
25. For an in depth survey of the past and present Canadian legislation at
both the provincial and federal level, See Landis, Legal Controls of Pollution in
the Great Lakes Basin, 48 CAN. B. REV. 66 (1970).
26. Bill C-144, introduced in the Second Session, Twenty-eighth Parlia-
ment, 18 ELIZ. II, 1969; s. 2 (1)(i).
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United States, cannot be expected to shoulder the financial strain
of cleaning up the adulteration in the Great Lakes. The fact is
that only the province of Ontario borders on the Lakes, and with-
out federal support it would be economically unable to bear the
cost of effective water pollution control.2 7
IV. THE CURRENT UNITED STATES-
CANADIAN JOINT APPROACH
The current joint approach consists of submitting any prob-
lem concerning pollution of the Great Lakes to the IJC for its
consideration. When either the United States or Canada make
a reference to the IJC, the Commission assembles experts provided
by each country and forms a research body to report to the IJC
so that recommendations can be made to the two governments.
Through this procedure the Commission has managed to remain
a small, well-organized body with a minimum of staff, and has been
able to avoid the rigidity that frequently accompanies a large per-
manent organization. 28
The theory behind the IJC is to operate as an impartial body
of fact finders, working together, rather than three members from
each country representing and promoting the interests of each
nation.29  This philosophy has been so successful that in approxi-
mately ninety questions that the IJC has been asked to investi-
gate, the Commissioners have been unable to reach a united de-
cision in only three isolated instances. 30
The governments of the United States and Canada have re-
ferred the question of pollution of the waters of the Great Lakes
to the IJC on three different occasions. 3 ' As a result, both gov-
ernments have recognized the value in turning to the IJC for pollu-
tion research, notwithstanding the fact the Commission has no en-
forcement powers.3 2 This is in part because the United States and
27. See note 25 supra.
28. Heeney and Welsh, International Joint Commission: United States and
Canada, International Conference on Water for Peace 217 (At Washington, D.C.,
May 23-31, 1967). The co-authors of the paper are A.D.P. Heeney, Chairman
of ,the Canadian Section of the IJC, and Mathew E. Welsh, Chairman of the U.S.
Section. See also Heeney, Diplomacy with a Difference: The International
Joint Commission, INCO MAGAZINE, 1 (Fall 1966).
29. See Heeney and Welsh, supra 28.
30. Id.
31. See notes 3, 4 & 6 supra.
32. See Heeney, supra note 28.
Vol. 2
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Canada have a long history of peaceful settlement and arbitration
of disputes, 33 and because the IJC machinery is the best that is
available at the present time for the limited function that it per-
forms.
3 4
There is no open or international water in the Great Lakes.
Each country owns and exercises dominion over its water as part of
its own national territory. 35  For that reason, the federal govern-
ment of the United States has made provision for curbing pollution
that is destined for the Great Lakes and has demonstrated its will-
ingness to work with the IJC. As J.P. Ericksen-Brown, Solicitor
of the Ontario Water Resources Commission, wrote,
[p]ollution of boundary waters is of concern to the federal
governments of both Canada and the United States and to the
border provinces and states. This concern arises from the
political responsibility of public authorities to safeguard the
public interest in clean water from the point of view of
health, recreation, and the conservation of fish and wildlife. 36
However, with all of its usefulness, the IJC, as it stands to-
day, can neither codify nor enforce pollution control regulations in
the Great Lakes. The Commission does not even have the power
to coordinate the activities of the concerned governments on ei-
ther side of the boundary.
V. SUGGESTED SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEM OF WATER
POLLUTION CONTROL IN THE GREAT LAKES
A. General Principles of International Law and their
Application to the Great Lakes
The waters of the Great Lakes are not "international wa-
ters" in the narrowest sense of the term. They are part of the na-
tional territories of the United States and Canada by virtue of the
1925 Boundary Treaty between the two countries.37  As pointed
out above, the federal governments of the two countries do not
hold title to the water or the beds of the Lakes; the states and
33. See P.E. CORBETT, THE SETTLEMENT OF CANADIAN-AMERICAN Dis-
PUTES (1937).
34. Ericksen-Brown, Legal Implications of Boundary Water Pollution,
17 BUF. L. REV. 65 (1967).
35. See The Boundary Treaty between the U.S. and Canada, February 24,
1925, 44 STAT. 2102.
36. See note 34 supra.
37. See PIPER, supra note 1; see also note 35 supra.
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provinces are the title holders. However, the federal governments
do exercise jurisdiction over certain aspects of the water use, such
as navigation.38 The waters of the Great Lakes (with the excep-
tion of Lake Michigan which is wholly within the territory of the
United States) are boundary waters, and are subject to all of the
jurisdictional complexities that flow therefrom."9 The Lakes form
the internatonal boundary between the two countries and the gen-
eral principles of international law should be applied to a dispute
therein.4" As former U.S. President Lyndon B. Johnson stated in
1969, the Great Lakes have an "international nature" and all deal-
ings with reference to them must be conducted accordingly. 4
The question that arises in this particular context is the ap-
plication of current international law to the use of the water lying
wholly within the territorial limits of the United States and Can-
ada, i.e., the rights and interests of the other sovereign, and the
responsibilities flowing therefrom.
The Institute of International Law, in 1911, stated that the
"exploitation of water for industrial, agricultural, and other pur-
poses, remains outside the provisions of the [international] law."'42
In other words, the theory embelishes the doctrine of the ab-
solute sovereignty of each nation. Former Attorney General of
the United States Judson Harmon was an advocate of this theory.
It was the cornerstone of the Harmon Doctrine, that a state can do
as it pleases with the waters located within its territory.43 Har-
mon wrote that "the fundamental principle of international law is
the absolute sovereignty of every nation as against all others,
within its own territory. '4 4  But the well-known authority on in-
ternational water law Professor Berber, characterizes this view of
absolute sovereignty with respect to the use of water as "based
upon an individualistic, anarchical conception of international law,
in which selfish interests are exclusively taken as the rule of con-
38. 56 AM. JuR. WATERS §§ 190-200.
39. Welsh, Role of the International Joint Commission, delivered at
Proc. 12th Conf. Great Lakes Res. 1969, 871-875, Int'l Assoc. Great Lakes Res.
40. See note 37 supra.
41. See note 39 supra.
42. 24 ANNUAIRE DE L'INSTITUT DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 365 (1911).
43. See 21 Ops. ATTY. GEN. (1895). Harmon's Doctrine was formu-
lated in his reply to a protest by Mexico that the U.S. was diverting waters of
the Rio Grande in 1895.
44. Id. at 281.
Vol. 2
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duct and no solution is offered regarding the opposite interests
of upper and lower riparians.' 4
There is in contrast, a theory in international law which is
based upon the principle, sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas.40
Every state is obliged not to knowingly allow its territory to be
used for acts contrary to the rights of other states. *7  The Secre-
tary-General of the United Nations has expressed the view that
"there has been a general recognition of the rule that a State must
not permit the use of its territory for purposes injurious to the in-
terests of other States in a manner contrary to international law."4s
As to the specific aspect on the use of water, the principle of
sic utere tuo is most certainly applicable. This is true of co-ri-
parians in an internatonal drainage basin such as the Great
Lakes.4 9 One state can use the water in its territory for its own
purposes but not to the injury or detriment of another state.5"
The U.S. Department of State has reasoned that "a riparian
has the sovereign right to make maximum use of the part of a
system of international waters within its jurisdiction, consistent
with the corresponding right of each co-riparian. ' 15 ' The Depart-
ment has concluded that
[s]overeignty exists and is absolute in the sense that each state
has exclusive jurisdiction and control over its territory. Each
state possesses equal rights on either side of a boundary line.
Thus riparians each possess the right of exclusive jurisdiction
and control over the part of a system of international waters
45. J. BERBER, RIVERS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1959).
46. Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas means one must so use his own
as not to do injury to another. See, Eagleton, The Use of the Waters of
International Rivers, 33 CAN. B. REV. 1018, 1023 (1955); and T. BRIERLY,
LAW OF NATIONS 205 (5th ed. 1955).
47. Manner, Water Pollution in International Law: The Rights and Obli-
gations of States Concerning Pollution of Inland Waters and Enclosed Seas,
UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON WATER POLLUTION PROBLEMS IN EUROPE, Vol.
II, at 456-457 (Conference held in Geneva, 1961), 61.II.E/Mim.24.
48. See Survey of International Law 34 (1949), U.N. Doe. A/CN.4/l,
Rev. 1.
49. A.H. GARRETSON, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL DRAINAGE BASINS
(1967). An international drainage basin is a geographical area extending to or
over the territory of two or more states and is bounded by watershed extremities
of the system of waters, including surface and underground waters, all of
which flow into a common terminus. See INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION,
HELSINKI RULES ON THE USES OF THE WATERS OF INTERNATIONAL RIVERS,
Art. II (1967); and the REPORT OF THE FIFTY-SECOND CONFERENCE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION (Helsinki, 1966).
50. See note 43 supra, from a resolution of the Tenth Conference of the
Inter-American Bar Association, Buenos Aires, November 19, 1957.
51. Id. at 89.
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in their territory, and these rights reciprocally restrict the
freedom of actions of the others. 52
This is in accord with the prevailing theory that co-riparians have
mutual rights and obligations between them in their uses of wa-
ters which they share, thereby creating a condition of limited sov-
ereignty.13
The mutual rights theory is lodged in the principle of equi-
table utilization (equitable apportionment or beneficial use). The
Helsinki Rules on the Use of Waters of International Rivers con-
tain a resolution that "each basin State is entitled, within its terri-
tory, to a reasonable and equitable share of the beneficial uses of
the water of an international drainage basin."54  This doctrine has
been extended specifically to encompass the area of water pollu-
tion. 5 E. J. Manner, Vice Chancellor Justice of Finland, states
that there is a
principle which is gaining increasing acceptance in interna-
tional practice: that an extension of the consequences of
pollution into another State's territory must be regarded as a
violation of that State's integrity or as a certain kind of inter-
ference in international law.56
1. International Case Law.-There have only been two disputes
over the economic use of international waters which were resolved
by judicial decision, and neither of them concerned the problem
of water pollution.5" However, in the collateral problem of air
pollution, the Trial Smelter decision may offer authority for the
application of the equitable utilization principle in the area of wa-
52. Id. at 89-90.
53. Laylin and Bianchi, The Role of Adjudication in International River
Disputes, 53 AM. J. INT'L L. 30 (1959).
54. HELSINKI RULES ON THE USE OF THE WATERS OF INTERNATIONAL
RrvEns, Chap. 2, Art. IV.
55. Id., Chap. 3, Art. X. This article reads as follows:
1. Consistent with the principle of equitable utilization of the waters
of an international drainage basin, a State (a) must prevent any
new form of water pollution or any increase in the degree of exist-
ing water pollution in an international drainage basin which would
cause substantial injury in the territory of a co-basin State, and(b) should take all reasonable measures to abate existing water pol-
lution in an international drainage basin to such an extent that no
substantial damage is caused in the territory of a co-basin State.
See also note 49 supra, at 62-63.
56. 3 WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 23 (1964).
57. See note 49 supra. See also Diversion of Waters from the Meuse,
P.C.I.J., Ser, A/B, No. 70 (1937); Lake Lanoux Case (Spain v. France), 24
I.L.R. 101 (1957).
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ter pollution, because that case is the locus classicus on the re-
sponsibility of a state for extraterritorial injury.58
2. Remedies.-The International Law Association has resolved
that "preventable pollution of water in one state which does sub-
stantial injury to another state renders the former state responsible
for damage done.""9  There appears to be no doubt that the in-
jured state may collect compensatory damages from the injuring
state caused by polluted waters.6" However, this remedy is avail-
able only after the harm has resulted and is not an effective solution
to the control and prevention of the problem, i.e., pollution. What
is needed is an order or an injunction that will prevent the states
from further polluting common waters. There is some authority
for preliminary relief, but there is no degree of certainty that it will
be granted by an international tribunal applying the rules of in-
ternational law. 0
3. Summary of Solutions Through International Law Principles.
-When considering the application of the general rules of inter-
national law to the control of water pollution in the Great Lakes,
the issue must be stated in reference to the situation that now
exists between the United States and Canada. Not only are the
theories uncertain, but the results to be derived by such an appli-
cation are dubious. Even if the problem was submitted to an inter-
national tribunal for adjudication, it would be an after-the-fact
response which would not effectively aid control of water pollu-
tion in the Lakes in the future. Effective water pollution control
must be a coordinated effort which originates in the two countries
and is aimed toward the future. Submission to an international
tribunal to apply principles of international law to reach an adju-
dication does not serve this end, nor does it create an atmosphere
58. Trial Smelter Case, 3 U.N. Rep. Int'l Arb. Awards 1905 (1949). This
case between the United States and Canada involved the international flow of
air pollution from a smelter at Trial, British Columbia. The flow adversely
affected agriculture in the state of Washington just south of the international
boundary. A special convention was created by the two countries to settle the
claim, and such was done in favor of those in Washington.
59. COMMITTEE ON THE USES OF WATERS OF INTERNATIONAL RIVERS, IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION (Conference at Dubrovnik, Yugoslavia (1956)).
See note 49 supra, at 62-63.
60. See note 49 supra, at 102.
61. Trial Smelter Case, supra note 56; Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. Case, I.C.J.
Rep. 89, 93-95 (1951); The Electricity Company of Sofia and Bulgaria Case,
P.C.I.J. Ser, A/B, No. 79, 194, 199 (1939); Belgina-Chinese Case, P.C.I.J., Ser,
A. No. 8, 6, 7-8 (1927).
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of conciliation and mediation or facilitate coordination of planning
and enforcement. International law is only as operative as the
participating countries desire it to be. Since there is currently a
spirit of cooperation between Canada and the United States, it
would appear that there are more effective avenues to curb pol-
lution in the Great Lakes than application of the general principles
of international law.
B. Treaties
Many of the co-riparian nations of the world have enacted
treaties to deal with the problems of water use and pollution.62
The treaties as well as the negotiations leading to them seem to
employ theories which limit the power of sovereigns to utilize their
waters in any way that they desire, without regard to the effects
on the water or the injuries that would be sustained by other co-
riparian nations. 63 Professor Berber has written that "the conclu-
sion of specific and specialized water treaties remains far and away
the best solution [to the problems of water use and pollution con-
trol].16 4  Nearly all of these treaties call for arbitration in refer-
ence to the use of these waters. 65
1. Considerations Favoring a Treaty.-An obligation to submit
the problem of water pollution to arbitration or adjudication argu-
ably promotes reasonableness in the dealings between co-ripar-
ians. 6 The obligations and the resultant commitment to arbitra-
tion or adjudication will frequently induce agreement by negotia-
62. Griffin, The Use of Waters of International Drainage Basins Under
Customary International Law, 53 AM. J. INT'L L. 50 (1959); and for the
Western Hemisphere, see Claggett, Survey of Agreements Providing for Third-
Party Resolution of International Water Disputes, 55 AM. J. INT'L L. 645 (1961).
63. See Griffin, supra note 62, at 50.
64. See note 45 supra, at 270.
65. See Claggett, supra note 62. See, e.g.:
a. Treaties in U.N. Doc. A/5409, between Austria and Hungary (UN
Treaty Series, vol. 438, No. 6315, (1959));
b. Columbia River Treaty, 44 DEP'T OF STATE BULL. 234 (1961), and
the Indus. Waters Treaty, 123 WORLD AFFAIRS 99 (1960), which call
for arbitration;
c. There are, in addition to bilateral or regional agreements, two
world wide conventions on the uses of watercourses which mention
third-party settlement of disputes:
1. Convention of Barcelona, 7 L.N.T.S. 37 (to which neither the
U.S. nor Canada is a signatory), and
2. Geneva Convention, 36 L.N.T.S. (to which the U.S. and Canada
are not signatories, nor has either ratified this convention).
66. See note 53 supra, at 49.
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tion at the outset of the situation. 7  The same theory underlies
the Charter of the United Nations which calls on nations to use
mediation, arbitration, or adjudication, among other prescribed
means, to promote peaceful dealings between nations. 68 This the-
ory revolves around the recognition that all nations believe them-
selves to be completely sovereign, when in fact there is a need for
nations to restrict their sovereignty. Thus the provision that an
independent agency or institution shall decide the conflicts between
them is professed with the hope that it will create a conciliatory
attitude on the part of each nation in its relations with the other.
2. Considerations Opposing a Treaty.-There are significant
arguments against the idea that a treaty providing for mandatory ar-
bitration is the most advantageous manner to solve the problem of
water pollution. In any case, such provisions are an after-the-fact
consideration. Joint planning may be more effective in order to
initially prevent or eliminate possible threats to water quality. 69
The Supreme Court of the United States in Colorado v. Kan-
sas, held that there is a further consideration when dealing with
sovereigns or quasi-sovereigns (states) in the area of arbitration
and adjudication.
The reason for judicial caution in adjudicating the rela-
tive rights of States in such cases [water use cases in this in-
stance] is that, they invoke the interests of delicate questions,
and, due to the possibility of future change of conditions,
necessitate expert administration rather than judicial imposi-
tion of a hard and fast rule. Such controversies may appro-
priately be composed by negotiation and agreement, pursuant
to the compact clause of the federal Constitution. We say
of this case, as the Court has said of interstate differences of
like nature, that such mutual accommodation and agreement
should, if possible, be the medium of settlement instead of in-
vocation of our adjudicatory power.70
67. Id. at 41.
68. Article 33(1) of the Charter of the United Nations, in part, calls for
nations to "seek solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, ar-
bitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or
other peaceful means of their choice .. "
69. HELSINKI RULES, PROCEDURES FOR THE PREVENTION AND SETTLEMENT
oF DispuTEs, Chap. 6, Art. XXX states that "Although certain disputes about
international rivers and international river basins may lend themselves to
third-party adjudication under established international law, the maximum utiliza-
tion of an international drainage basin can more effectively be secured through
joint planning."
70. Colorado v. Kansas, 320 U.S. 383, 392 (1943).
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It would appear that the Court's reasoning could be applied a
fortiori to the situation between the United States and Canada in
the Great Lakes.
3. Special Convention.-Another treaty-related consideration is
that of a special convention, which normally provides for the so-
lution of a particular problem and is limited to that instance. An
example is the agreement reached between the United States and
Canada in the Trial Smelter case which, dealt with the analogous
and collateral problem of air pollution.7 ' The drawback how-
ever, is that a special convention is limited to the instant problem
before it. The convention provides the means to investigate the
underlying facts and provide for a mediator. However, it too is
an after-the-fact consideration which has little or no lasting effect
outside the actual problem considered. Thus, its relative worth
to a permanent and long-range solution to water pollution is di-
minished. The real issue is the protection of present and future
uses of the water, and not just the adjudication of past misuse.
C. Creation of a Joint Agency for the Control of
Water Pollution in the Great Lakes
Although the IJC has no enforcement power, it has been a
constructive organization. It has promoted a sense of community
between Canada and the United States, and has created an at-
mosphere of mutual understanding and respect. However, the
pollution problem has reached such a stage that there is a need for
greater cooperative planning and coordination; a need which is
beyond the present scope of the authority of the IJC. The crea-
tion of a new joint agency, vested with the power to coordinate the
efforts of both countries toward the solution of this monumental
problem before it destroys the Lakes is a necessity.
The control of pollution in the boundary waters is the respon-
sibility of the local and federal governments of Canada and the
United States. The work and funds must originate from the two
countries. To recommend a supranational agency with the power
of total direction and adjudication is utopian, even between two
governments which have a history of conciliation and cooperation
such as the United States and Canada. However, an agency with
the power to promote and coordinate the objectives and imple-
mentations of the two governments (a power that is lacking in
the IJC) is sorely needed.
71. See note 58 supra.
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In 1969, after an exhaustive study of the pollution problem in
the Lakes, the IJC itself recommended "that an appropriate Board
be appointed on a continuing basis for the coordination of joint
international programs in water pollution control of the Great
Lakes."72 After the IJC conducted its first survey of the pollution
problem in the Lakes between 1912 and 1918, it recommended
that the power and authority of the IJC be expanded so as to allow
it to take a more active role in regulating the use of the Lakes and
prohibiting pollution of the waters crossing the boundary. 3 The
two governments accepted the report and requested that the IJC
prepare a convention that made provision for the implementation
of the recommendations. The draft convention was drawn and
submitted to the governments for consideration. However, no ac-
tion was taken on these recommendations and the IJC remained
powerless either to coordinate the pollution control efforts in the
Lakes, or to begin studies and make recommendations on its own
volition without reference by the two governments.
To change the powers of the IJC or to vest the powers in a
new joint agency would require a convention or a new treaty be-
tween Canada and the United States. Thought here must be given
to the constitutional limitations in which each government is
shrouded.
The consideration of constitutional restraints may not pose
the problem that one might first imagine. What is proposed is
not an agency with the power to manage all aspects of the Great
Lakes, or to dictate to the responsible agencies on each side of the
border, or even to have all encompassing powers of enforcement.
The fact that any joint agency between countries is only as effective
as the two nations want it to be, and neither will likely surrender any
of its sovereignty to obtain such a powerful institution. What is
needed, and what would be desirable for both nations, is to in-
crease the powers of the IJC, or to vest the powers in a new joint
agency that would be able to coordinate the pollution control ef-
forts of all governmental agencies of each country.
One current example of the need for such coordination is
illustrated by the 1969 report of the IJC. Therein the Commis-
72. See note 6 supra, at 13.
73. See note 3 supra; see also Hearings Before the National Resources
and Power Subcommittee of the House Committee on Government Operations,
"Water Pollution-Great Lakes", July 22, 1966, Statement by Hon. Matthew E.
Welsh, Chairman, U.S. Sect. International Joint Commission.
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sion recommended an international contingency plan to deal with
pollution incidents, such as oil spills and other problems that might
arise and need immediate response by each nation in a joint ef-
fort. 74 The IJC, as it stands today is powerless to coordinate this
type of action. Canada and the United States need an agency
that can do so immediately on its own volition. The welfare and
future of the Great Lakes and the people and economy which de-
pend on the Lakes is at stake, and we should not be bound by the
ineffectual consequences of the present arrangement.
VI. CONCLUSION
The water pollution problem in the Great Lakes has reached
emergency proportions. Any effective solution must have as its
goal the present and future unadulterated use of those bodies of
water. Neither the general principles of international law, nor a
treaty which calls for mandatory arbitration or adjudication can
provide a workable answer. The current structure of the IJC does
not lend itself toward solving the problem. When one realizes
that the pollution in the Great Lakes is mainly from the internal
territorial limits of the United States and Canada, one must rec-
ognize that each of these nations, together with their respective
political subdivisions, has both the obligation and responsibility to
stop pollution. 5
It is apparent that a coordinated effort by both the United
States and Canada is the only answer to the current pollution prob-
lem in the Great Lakes. As recently as June 12, 1971, the gov-
ernments of these two countries met and announced the beginning
of negotiations for a new treaty that will provide for an effective,
joint water pollution control program to aid the clean-up of the
Great Lakes. 8 It is only hoped that the treaty will provide for an
effective, workable, coordinating agency that will be empowered
to exercise supervision and direction over the efforts of the two
74. See note 6 supra, at 11; and see INTERNATIONAL LAKE ERIE WATER
POLLUTION BOARD, REPORT ON POTENTIAL OIL POLLUTION INCIDENTS FROM OIL
AND GAS WELL ACITIES IN LAKE ERIE: THEIR PREVENTION AND CONTROL, 17
(1969).
75. On August 17, 1971, the Conference of Great Lakes Governors and
Premiers recognized the obligation of the two countries to clean up the Great
Lakes. The resolutions of the conference called for a beefing up of the IJC
and for a quick negotiation and implementation of the new treaty designed for
that purpose. N.Y. Times, August 18, 1971, at 75, col. 4.
76. N.Y. Times, June 13, 1971, § 4, at 2, col. 3.
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countries and thus bring about an immediate implementation of
the valuable research and recommendations made by the IJC.
Gibson E. Pratt
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